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SOLVING THE CSO CONUNDRUM: GREEN
INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE
OF FEDERAL-MUNICIPAL COOPERATION
Caswell F. Holloway, * Carter H. Strickland, Jr., **
Michael B. Gerrard, t and Daniel M. Firgertt
Faced with mounting infrastructure construction costs and more frequent and se-
vere weather events due to climate change, cities across the country are managing the
water pollution challenges of stormwater runoff and combined sewer overflows through
new and innovative "green infrastructure" mechanisms that mimic, maintain, or restore
natural hydrological features in the urban landscape. When utilized properly, such
mechanisms can obviate the need for more expensive pipes, storage facilities, and other
traditional "grey infrastructure "features, so named to acknowledge the vast amounts of
concrete and other materials with high embedded energy necessary in their construc-
tion. Green infrastructure can also provide substantial co-benefits to city dwellers, such
as cleaner air, reduced urban temperatures, and quality of life improvements associated
with recreation areas and wildlife habitats.
This Article examines the opportunities and challenges presented by municipal
green infrastructure programs in the context of Clean Water Act ("CWA ") enforcement
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA "). First, it explores new thinking in
urban sustainability and identifies opportunities for greater federal-municipal coopera-
tion in the management of environmental problems, including stormwater runoff. Sec-
ond, it unpacks the challenges presented by the relative inflexibility of federal
environmental enforcement in the context of urban stormwater management under the
CWA, and compares the differences between traditional federal approaches and newer
local initiatives in terms of adaptability, responsiveness to community needs, prefer-
ences and trade-offs, cost effectiveness, and innovation. Third, it describes a recent con-
sent agreement between New York State and New York City, identifying key features and
best practices that can be readily replicated in other jurisdictions. In recent years, EPA
has taken big steps forward to encourage and support municipal green infrastructure
initiatives, including the release of its Integrated Municipal Stormwater and Wastewater
Planning Approach Framework. The Article concludes with a specific proposal for fur-
ther regulatory and policy reform that would build upon this framework to develop truly
comprehensive, municipally-led plans to prioritize infrastructure investments that im-
prove public health and the environment.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the evolving interface between federal environmen-
tal laws and municipal regulation of land use, as seen through the lens of green
infrastructure. Federal-municipal interactions in this area raise a host of diffi-
cult and pressing questions concerning the allocation of scarce resources to
improve public health, minimize the urban environmental footprint, attract tal-
ented individuals, and foster economic development across cities worldwide.
Traditionally, these disparate goals have been only loosely affiliated under the
rubric of "quality of life," but today they are increasingly understood as ele-
ments of integrated, coherent, and synergistic urban sustainability programs
that are built upon a common cost/benefit foundation.
Perhaps the best example of how sustainability planning can integrate ap-
parently dissimilar environmental and quality of life mandates is the use of
green infrastructure to meet federal Clean Water Act ("CWA") obligations. The
need for a new conceptual framework in this arena is the result of an inherent,
and as yet unresolved, conflict in environmental policy: Dense settlement in
urban centers is relatively energy efficient on a per capita basis, yet can gener-
ate significant amounts of localized air and water pollution. Among other
things, if pollution is regulated in a manner that significantly drives up the cost
of living in cities, then overall settlement will be less dense, driving up aggre-
gate energy use and pollution levels.
One important effect of the conversion of landscapes to closely spaced
residential and commercial buildings and roadways is that a large proportion of
the overall urban land surface sheds water, or is impermeable to rain. Cities
with a relatively high proportion of impermeable surfaces such as streets, side-
walks, and rooftops must cope with significant volumes of stormwater runoff
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during wet weather. Indeed, stormwater is now a leading cause of water pollu-
tion in most U.S. cities.
In many older American cities, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest,
stormwater runoff, whether from streets, rooftops or other impermeable sur-
faces, is handled together with residential and commercial wastewater by rela-
tively old single-pipe combined sewer systems ("CSS"). A typical CSS
receives both domestic sewage and stormwater, and drains to a publicly owned
treatment works ("POTW") where wastewater is treated. Such systems also
typically include a number of outfalls that discharge a mixture of untreated
sewage and stormwater runoff when peak storm flows overwhelm the system's
capacity. For many older U.S. cities that rely on CSS rather than municipal
separate stormwater systems, the dominant water quality issue is not
stormwater per se but rather combined sewer overflows ("CSOs"), the conse-
quence of heavy rains and the limitations of existing infrastructure.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") regulation of
stormwater discharges under the CWA is unusual among environmental laws in
that the major regulated entities are municipalities (rather than private corpora-
tions) and, as a consequence, a wide base of taxpayers or ratepayers are re-
quired to spend significant amounts of money on infrastructure projects for
stormwater management and the control of CSOs. Unlike other core municipal
services such as solid waste handling, snow removal, policing, traffic safety,
and the like, the CWA involves the federal government directly in wastewater
management services provided by local government. More commonly than
other federal environmental laws, the CWA imposes significant fiscal and
budgetary obligations directly upon municipalities (as opposed to the costs
borne by state governments or private entities related to regulatory capacity or
industrial activities, respectively). Consequently, important questions arise
about the interaction and boundaries between federal and municipal authorities.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the broad concept of
urban sustainability. This Part focuses on key questions such as how goals are
defined and set, who decides which goals to pursue, how to prioritize between
competing objectives, and who ultimately pays to achieve sustainability goals.
It also outlines a theoretical framework that can be applied more generally in
the context of federal-municipal coordination on flexible approaches to envi-
ronmental regulation. Part II examines the CWA in the context of cities, paying
particular attention to stormwater regulation and the mitigation of CSOs. It
goes on to introduce the concept of green infrastructure, compare the costs and
benefits of green and so-called "grey" infrastructure, and explore the interac-
tion between federal standards and local stormwater management programs.
Part III provides a case study drawing together the green infrastructure con-
cepts discussed in Part II and the key urban sustainability principles discussed
in Part I. The Article concludes with a specific proposal for further regulatory
and policy reform that would significantly extend EPA's Integrated Municipal
Stormwater and Wastewater Planning Approach Framework ("Integrated
Framework"), released in June 2012, to develop truly comprehensive, munici-
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pally-led plans to prioritize infrastructure investments that improve public
health and the environment.
By better aligning accountability for investment decisions with regulatory
planning at the municipal level, this proposal would lead to more efficient allo-
cation of resources, and more "ownership" by and engagement of the local
ratepayers who pay for CWA compliance. It would also lead to investments that
are better tailored to local conditions, innovative ideas that seek to maximize
positive externalities (as opposed to mere compliance with pollution minimiza-
tion targets), and less resentment towards one-size-fits-all regulations made in
the context of a sometimes distant national perspective. A strong, ongoing fed-
eral role in such policymaking would ensure that municipal plans have a solid
scientific foundation. EPA would also oversee progress towards milestones and
guarantee transparency and accountability through regular reporting, all within
an adaptive management framework.
I. URBAN SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
A. Key Questions
In 2008, for the first time in human history, more people worldwide were
living in cities than in rural areas.' Recognizing the growing importance of
municipal-scale initiatives on any number of environmental, public health, and
economic concerns, city governments in recent years have become increasingly
active and innovative players in sustainability policy making and implementa-
tion.2 In the United States-especially in the absence of comprehensive federal
policy on climate change-cities are taking the lead on a wide range of initia-
tives, from energy efficiency and green infrastructure to transportation planning
and urban agriculture.'
Of course, cities are not the only actors in the sustainability space; many
of the initiatives undertaken by municipalities are subject to overlapping regu-
'Urbanization: A Majority in Cities, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND (May 2007), http://
perma.cc/4B8W-Q83C ("In 2008, for the first time in history, more than half of the world's popu-
lation will be living in towns and cities.").
2 See, e.g., ASIAN DEV. BANK, GREEN URBANIZATION IN ASIA: KEY INDICATORS FOR ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC 2012: SPECIAL CHAPTER (2012), http://perma.cc/6ZEX-XPBH; C40 Cities Climate
Leadership Group, Global Leadership on Climate Change, http://perma.cc/A7YA-32BS; ICLEI
Local Governments for Sustainability, http://perma.cc/6DS6-YW73. More fundamentally, cities
are motivated by regional and, in some cases, global competition to attract citizens, cutting edge
industries, etc. They recognize that environmental health-sometimes synonymous with livable
cities-is necessary for economic health.
'See, e.g., PLANYC 2030: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK (2007), http://perma.cc/K9DK-
SAB4; Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs.
Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 681 (2008) (exploring the benefits of sub-national climate
change policy in the absence of federal leadership and international agreement). But see Jonathan
B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1961 (2007).
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latory mandates at the federal, state, and local levels. 4 For instance, the installa-
tion of neighborhood-scale green infrastructure to manage stormwater runoff,
prevent CSOs, and provide valuable co-benefits may be required to meet fed-
eral CWA and state water pollution statutes.' Nevertheless, in almost every
realm, the cityscape remains a primary locus for contemporary sustainability
initiatives, making municipal "green" governance-and the interaction among
municipal, federal, and state regulatory authorities-a subject worthy of careful
consideration.6
In examining these interactions, several initial questions can help us prop-
erly frame the scope of our inquiry and provide some structure for further dis-
cussion of particular programs such as municipal stormwater management and
CSO mitigation. First, what are the goals of urban sustainability initiatives and,
relatedly, how do we identify and delineate boundaries between such goals?
Second, who decides which goals are important, and who sets priorities among
multiple, often competing, objectives? Third, who pays to achieve such goals?
As we shall see in the context of stormwater management, each of these ques-
tions raises serious theoretical and practical considerations that have impacts on
communities and watersheds across the nation.
1. Goals?
a. Defining Goals
It is usually at the local level where the policy making rubber hits the
proverbial road of real world implementation, with the immediate effects felt,
for better or worse, in the daily lives of identifiable individuals and their local
communities.7 As demonstrated by public demands after major winter snow-
storms and, most recently, Superstorm Sandy, city officials face a much higher
degree of accountability for services than do their state or federal counterparts.
I This Article refers to "cities" and "municipalities" interchangeably, even though there are sig-
nificant differences between sustainability initiatives in a major city such as New York and at a
smaller municipal scale. See Hani M. Osofsky, Scaling "Local": The Implications of Greenhouse
Gas Regulation in San Bernardino County, 30 MICH. J. ITrr'L L. 689, 692 (2009) ("U.S. cities and
counties differ substantially in their sizes, the quantity and physical characteristics of their land,
the size and density of their populations, and the needs of their citizens.").
See, e.g., Press Release, EPA, EPA Administrator Jackson & Philadelphia Mayor Nutter Sign
Landmark Green City, Clean Waters Partnership Agreement (Apr. 10, 2012), available at http://
perma.cc/C7JF-6SC3.
6 See Keith H. Hirokawa, Sustaining Ecosystem Services Through Local Environmental Law, 28
PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 760, 776 (2011) ("[T]he local nature of sustainability is essential, as the
battle for sustainable development will almost certainly be decided in cities .... ") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Patricia E. Salkin, Can You Hear Me Up There? Giving Voice to Local
Communities Imperative for Achieving Sustainability, 4 ENvmn. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 256, 258
(2009) ("While the United States as a whole speaks through the federal government, the voices
and actions of local governments are critical to achieving truly sustainable communities .... ");
Peter H. Lehner, Act Locally: Municipal Enforcement of Environmental Law, 12 STAN. ENvnL.
L.J. 50 (1993).
7 Hirokawa, supra note 6, at 778 ("Local governments are always environmentally situated, and
ecosystems are always locally felt . . . . [L]and, by its nature, is inherently local.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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New York City Mayor John Lindsay's failure to have snow removed quickly
enough from parts of Queens after a 1969 snowstorm, and the consequent pub-
lic scom, is perhaps the most famous of many similar incidents.' By necessity,
municipal governments must be adept at balancing competing interests and pri-
orities and setting and achieving multiple goals that may cut across concep-
tually distinct issue areas or be subject to wholly separate regulatory regimes.
For instance, cities seeking to implement a broad mandate to improve the qual-
ity of life must regularly weigh both the tradeoffs and co-benefits among vari-
ous public health, environmental quality, and economic development programs.
With comprehensive urban sustainability initiatives such as New York
City's PlaNYC, municipalities are experimenting with new methods to achieve
these goals, often in ways that expressly create and capitalize on positive spil-
lover effects between hitherto distinct programmatic activities. 9 For instance,
PlaNYC expressly designed its open space plan in such a way that it would
help to achieve New York City's overall policy goals in several different areas,
including housing, water quality, energy conservation, and climate change. 10
Although by no means a comprehensive accounting, such goals can be charac-
terized in terms of one of four broad categories: public health and safety, envi-
ronmental quality, quality of life, and economic development.
i. Public Health and Safety
Many municipal regulatory initiatives throughout history have been de-
signed first and foremost to improve public health, up to and including new
programs being piloted today." The world's earliest septic systems, for exam-
'See VINCENT J. CANNATO, THE UNGOVERNABLE CITY: JOHN LINDSAY AND His STRUGGLE TO
SAVE NEW YORK (2001) (recounting the 1969 snowstorm and the mayor's response); Sewell Chan,
Remembering a Snowstorm that Paralyzed the City, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, http://perma.cc/
6PB7-GNPT.
I "Sustainability" can mean many things to many people. A rough working definition of urban
sustainability, for the purposes of this Article, is "the state a metropolitan community reaches
once it is able to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs." This definition was adopted by the authors of a 2004
report on urban sustainability prepared for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. See UNA
McGEOUGH ET AL., MODEL FOR SUSTAINABLE URBAN DESIGN 1 (2004), available at http://
perma.cc/56A4-3ZMH. Although this definition is quite broad, it properly encompasses many of
the key features of sustainability initiatives being adopted by cities around the world, from waste
management practices to energy conservation to open space preservation and public health cam-
paigns. Particularly in a time of tight budgets, the cross-cutting approach to sustainability being
taken by many municipalities, including New York City, is helping urban residents achieve multi-
ple sustainability objectives at once.
'0 See ICLEI-LocAL GOVERNMENTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY, THE PROCESS BEHIND PLANYC: How
THE CITY OF NEW YORK DEVELOPED PLANYC, ITS GROUNDBREAKING SUSTAINABILITY PLAN
28-29 (2010), http://perma.cc/YKP3-LNPB; see also Hirokawa, supra note 6, at 762 ("Local
environmental law generally involves a complex system of legislative and administrative proce-
dures, parochial values, overlapping jurisdictions, and often conflicting priorities.").
" New York City has pioneered several high profile public health initiatives in recent years, in-
cluding a 2003 ban on smoking in restaurants and bars, a 2006 phase out of artificial trans-fat in
all restaurants and other food establishments, and a 2012 proposal to prohibit the sale of large
sodas and other sugary drinks in similar locations. See Michael Howard Saul, City Plans to Re-
strict Big-Size Soda Sales, WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 31, 2012, at A19.
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pie, were constructed to minimize human contact with wastewater and thereby
prevent the spread of disease. New York City's pioneering Zoning Resolution
of 1916-which paved the way for modem land use regulation as we have
come to know it-was compelled at least in part by residents' desire to mitigate
the adverse public health and safety impacts of burgeoning urban development,
including concerns over access to adequate light and air. 2 Innovative urban
sustainability initiatives as varied as bicycle-friendly transportation infrastruc-
ture and green roofs are also meant to improve public health by encouraging
healthy behaviors such as bike-riding and by making it easier for city residents
to access locally grown fruits and vegetables. 3
ii. Environmental Quality
Of course, today's urban sustainability initiatives are not only concerned
with public health and safety, but also broader environmental issues such as
water quality, open space preservation, wildlife conservation, and climate
change.4 New York City's Green Infrastructure Plan, for example, is designed
to control stormwater runoff from impervious surfaces, limiting the volume and
frequency of CSOs and thereby improving water quality in New York Harbor in
accordance with the CWA's mandate, which is geared as much toward environ-
mental protection as it is toward human health. 5 Similarly, the MillionTrees-
NYC initiative was designed to improve open space while reducing energy use
and concomitant greenhouse gas emissions, both worthy environmental and ec-
onomic goals that can stand on their own quite apart from any public health or
quality of life objectives. 6
iii. Quality of Life
Unlike federal environmental regulators who can concern themselves pri-
marily with imposing scientific and technical pollution standards to protect
human health and environmental quality, local governments are the organs
through which citizens most directly engage in a "process of visioning the
community [and] identifying those physical and intangible characteristics that
are locally cherished as contributing to the quality of life."'7 Quality of life is
"About Zoning, N.Y.C. DEPT. OF Crrv PLANNING, http://perma.cc/TE74-QE9C.
' See, e.g., CrrmiKE, http://perma.cc/LM5M-WGET (New York City's new bike sharing pro-
gram); Henry Goldman, Brooklyn Yields Cucumbers as NYC Expands Industrial Roof Farms,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 2, 2012, http://perma.cc/W6JM-TRKH.
" With more than half of humanity living in cities, "initiatives at the state and local government
level, even standing alone, have the potential to dramatically contribute to the international effort
to slow the pace of global warming." Salkin, supra note 6, at 258 (citation omitted),
15 NYC DEP'T OF EN vTL. PROT., NYC GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN: A SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY
FOR CLEAN WATERWAYS 15 (2010) [hereinafter GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN], available at
http://perma.cc/56SA-6XMT.
'6 Id. at 17.
'" Hirokawa, supra note 6, at 770.
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something of a catchall category. With its roots in Euclidean zoning, 8 munici-
pal park development, and even nuisance law, the contemporary conception of
"quality of life" incorporates public health and environmental goals alongside
education, housing, transportation, public safety, recreation, aesthetics, and
other values. 9 In each locality, citizens may hold distinct values that yield par-
ticular priorities-whether economic, environmental, or social-for shaping
the character of their community. When planning for future infrastructure im-
provements, city governments must therefore "wrestle[ ] not only with . . .
physical constraints ... but also with the fundamental values implicit in those
policy choices,"20 balancing competing objectives such as environmental pro-
tection and economic development, both of which may contribute to citizens'
conceptions of quality of life.
iv. Economic Development
Urban sustainability goals, particularly in developing countries but also
here in the United States, typically include a significant sustainable economic
development component. For instance, the Partnership for Sustainable Commu-
nities, a federal interagency collaboration among the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, the Department of Transportation, and EPA,2' aims to
"help communities around the country better meet their housing, transporta-
tion, and environmental goals-laying the groundwork for an economy that
provides good jobs now and creates a strong foundation for long-term prosper-
ity." 22 This vision of integrating economic development and environmental pro-
tection is at the core of many urban sustainability programs, whether
acknowledged explicitly or simply implicit in their design.
New York City's PlaNYC, which is "focused on the physical city, and its
possibilities to unleash opportunity," makes the link between sustainability and
economic growth quite clear.23 A major impetus for the plan was the demo-
graphic projection of a million more City residents by 2030, the equivalent of
18 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding local zoning ordi-
nance and establishing the modem legal framework for "Euclidean" zoning regulation
nationwide).
19 An interesting and relatively novel catchall metric for quality of life is the "Google Walkability
Index," which has been used by researchers to examine the correlation between walkable neigh-
borhoods and public health outcomes. See Karen Glanz et al., Google Walkability: A New Tool for
Local Planning and Public Health Research?, 9 J. PHYsicAL AcTivrrv & HEALTH 689, 689
(2012). In New York City, Nate Silver, the former proprietor of the Five Thirty Eight polling
analysis blog at The New York Times, authored a popular cover story in New York Magazine, along
with an associated interactive website, utilizing a comprehensive quality of life matrix to rank the
city's neighborhoods using factors such as access to public transportation, amount of green space,
crime rates, and the quality of local schools. See Nate Silver, The Most Livable Neighborhoods in
New York, N. Y. MAGAZINE, April 11, 2010, http://perma.cc/4QWD-VB2K.2 PLANYC, supra note 3, at 10.
21 PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE ComamuNrrms, http://perma.cc/JJK5-AGUB.
22 PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMuNITIEs, THREE YEARS OF HELPING COMMUNITIES
ACHIEVE THEIR VISIONS FOR GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 1 (2012), available at http://perma.cc/
9S88-ABLN.
23 PLANYC, supra note 3, at 3.
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accommodating the populations of both Miami and Boston with existing infra-
structure over a twenty-year period. As the plan demonstrates, protecting public
health and the environment while ensuring other quality of life improvements is
necessary for New York City to compete effectively against national and inter-
national rivals for jobs and residents, and has the potential to create real eco-
nomic opportunities at the neighborhood, borough, city, or regional scale.
However, to make such decisions, policy makers must set boundaries and es-
tablish priorities.
b. Setting Boundaries
Today's major policy challenges, from financial stimulus to terrorism, can-
not be readily contained within easily discernible geographic boundaries. As
Professor Ashira Ostrow explains, "[i]n a world where capital and information
flow freely across national and subnational boundaries, few regulatory matters
can be cabined within the jurisdictional lines of a single state, let alone a single
locality. '24 What is true for economic and social problems is even more obvi-
ous for environmental issues; it is seldom the case that political and administra-
tive lines on a map are coextensive with the natural boundaries of an
ecosystem, airshed, or watershed.25 Indeed, regulators at EPA and state environ-
mental protection agencies have begun to recognize this reality, taking an
ecosystem- or watershed-wide approach to thorny problems such as toxic con-
tamination that for economic, political, and practical reasons had previously
been dealt with in a much more piecemeal fashion. 6
Furthermore, none of the conceptually distinct objectives identified above
can be achieved in a vacuum as the deployment of regulations and resources to
achieve solutions in one area will have measurable impacts on related objec-
tives, particularly in a densely settled urban milieu. In many cases, there will be
positive spillover effects, as in the case of the obvious relationship among
green infrastructure, quality of life improvements, and reductions in CSO vol-
ume and frequency. 27 Sometimes, there are clear tradeoffs between competing
land uses and public policy goals, as in the case of conflicts between open
space preservation and new residential or commercial construction. Often, one
2 4 Ashira P. Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1397 (2012); see Robert B.
Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing Nature of Modem Juris-
diction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2007).
25 Indeed, New York City's Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") has authority to
protect and manage the city's drinking water supply even though most of the reservoir system is
located upstate in the Catskill/Delaware and Croton watersheds, both of which are far outside city
limits. See N.Y.C. R. & Regs. §18-11-§18-91 (2010); see also Jon Paul Rodrfguez et al., Interac-
tions among Ecosystem Services, in ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SCENARIOS, Vol. 2,
431 (2005) (exploring the complex interactions between various ecosystem services and human
activities).
26 See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, Superfund Cleanup Stirs Troubled Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2012, http://perma.cc/WF7A-623W ("Environmental officials say they have learned through trial
and error that it can be far more effective to take an entire river system into account, rather than
proceeding piecemeal.").
27 See infra Part lI.C.2.c.
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program will impose both costs and benefits on another programmatic area.2" In
most matters the municipal government, and ultimately citizens themselves,
must set boundaries between multiple objectives and priorities with regard to
municipal investments. This default would apply to investments in wastewater
systems in the absence of federal and state oversight.
2. Who Decides?
Regulatory authority over environmental quality is "widely distributed
across many levels and types of governmental entities,"29 but in the United
States such authority has been ordered hierarchically since the 1970s, with the
federal government holding ultimate power. In the context of the CWA, the
authority to implement federal water quality standards and issue National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits may be delegated to
states, which in turn impose stringent requirements on municipalities, typically
treating them-except in certain narrow circumstances-as subjects of regula-
tion rather than regulators in their own right. 0 By contrast, municipal authority
to regulate land use and zoning is traditionally quite extensive and a presump-
tive part of the residual "police power,"'" meaning that it is almost always local
government officials who are responsible for planning the layout of neighbor-
hoods, building and maintaining grey and green infrastructure, and providing a
range of essential public services. Difficult theoretical and practical questions
arise where these "top down" and "bottom up" regulatory domains intersect.
This Article examines these issues in the context of stormwater management
and CSO control policy.
On the one hand, there are good reasons for the now customary federal
preeminence in environmental protection and enforcement. The rise of federal
environmental regulation in the 1960s and 1970s was a direct attempt to miti-
gate the negative externalities of parochial decision making by state and local
officials, including (but by no means limited to) decision making about land
use, such as the siting and operation of factories. As Dean Patricia Salkin ex-
plains, "in many instances, issues of larger geographic significance [such as air
and water quality] may not be addressed by local officials due to the lack of
perspective, funding, or support."32 By federalizing environmental protection,
28 For example, an increase in the number of trees and planted areas in a New York City neighbor-
hood may help reduce CSO volumes while providing shade in the summer, thus reducing energy
use for air conditioning and at the same time imposing additional costs associated with the risk of
downed trees and fallen limbs during severe storms or heavy snows. See, e.g., Lisa Foderaro,
Storm Inflicted a Beating on Trees, N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 12, 2012, at A22.
29 Hirokawa, supra note 6, at 783.
30 See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1990) ("Land use control is the most important local regulatory
power.").
'
2 Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J. MARSHALL L.
Rev. 253, 254 n.5 (2012) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTINO OFmCE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
FEDERAL INCENTIVES COULD HELP PROMOTE LAND UsE THAT PROTECTS AIR AND WATER QUAL-
rry 63 (2001), available at http://perma.cc/9JFX-EPHW).
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modem environmental law imposes uniform standards across the country, pre-
serving natural resources and protecting public health by preventing the "race
to the bottom" that might otherwise occur in the absence of a federal regulatory
"floor," as polluting activities migrate from jurisdictions with strong environ-
mental controls to those with weaker ones.33 The inherent parochialism of local
politics and the desire to avoid short-term costs, even in those cases where
cleaner cities might provide longer-term benefits, provides one set of argu-
ments in favor of federal authority to determine environmental goals.3 4
On the other hand, federal regulators generally do not face the financial
and operational needs to balance competing or even contradictory programs
that are specific to individual media. If cities do not have an incentive to think
about other cities, it is equally true that the federal government is not held
directly accountable for the costs of obligations it can impose on cities and
citizens under federal environmental laws and associated regulatory programs.
The disconnect in accountability at the federal level was masked for the first
two decades of CWA enforcement, when substantial federal grants helped mu-
nicipalities pay for federal mandates, but that support has since disappeared.35
Moreover, regulation at the federal level can often fail to take into consid-
eration local conditions that, particularly when environmental objectives inter-
sect with the vagaries of land use control, may make all the difference for the
success or failure of a given regulatory program.36 For example, "federal man-
dates that municipalities treat stormwater like industrial pollution discharges
... may make sense in the northeast, but such requirements are ill-suited to arid
regions with little rainfall or clay-based soils."37
The local nature of most environmental problems, then, militates in the
other direction, in favor of decentralized decision making. One reason is that it
is easier for citizens to participate and make their preferences known at the
local level,38 where governments must respond to community needs and prefer-
ences,3 9 while federal agencies "are remote from average citizens and lack ef-
fective, low-cost channels through which citizens can communicate and
11 Ostrow, supra note 24, at 1402 ("The body of federal law is bound by a common objective-to
counterbalance the harm that would result from unfettered local control over land use.").
'4 But the federal government does not necessarily focus its attention on those environmental
issues where its involvement would make the biggest difference. See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdic-
tional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 130, 160 (2005) ("While
the federal government is hyperactive in its focus on local environmental concerns, it is less active
in those areas where the case for federal involvement is strongest.").
3 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
36 Adler, supra note 34, at 136 ("The failure to take into account local environmental conditions-
let alone local tastes, preferences, and economic conditions-leads to 'one size fits all' policies
that fit few areas well, if at all.").
37 Id. (citing PIETRO S. NIVOLA & JON A. SHIELDS, MANAGING GREEN MANDATES: LocAL RIGORS
OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 36 (2001)).
38 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980) (arguing that
smaller jurisdictions allow for greater public participation in political processes).
39 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REv. 499, 536 (1995) ("Safe-
guarding community decision making enhances diversity, as groups are allowed to decide their
own nature and composition. Communities can define themselves to best serve the needs of their
members.").
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implement their views."4 Moreover, from a purely political perspective, fed-
eral elections are not and cannot be about primarily local issues and concerns.
And without that general political feedback, decision making at the federal
level resides in administrative bodies with less direct accountability to affected
parties. Aware of how these dynamics play out in the democratic process, some
scholars have argued for a "rebuttable presumption" for local- or state-level
regulatory authority, acknowledging that the presumption should be overcome
when centralized (i.e., federal) action will yield better results. 41 Such a default
rule would help prevent the unintended consequence of federal regulatory stan-
dards serving as a "ceiling" rather than a "floor," that is, discouraging state
and local authorities from adopting measures that are more protective than the
federal rules rather than preventing a regulatory race to the bottom.42
3. Who Pays?
Federal water quality mandates can create a significant mismatch between
municipal capital budgeting resources and the priorities of citizens and taxpay-
ers on whose behalf municipal expenditures are ostensibly made. Between
2002 and 2009, for instance, New York City "invested more capital funds in
environmental protection than on other critical municipal functions, including
education, transportation, and housing. '43 While New Yorkers certainly value
water quality, they also value safety, affordable housing, and other public
goods, and should have the ability to allocate scarce resources according to
their priorities. With limited funds available and a long and growing list of
overlapping urban sustainability (and other) priorities, 44 however, the question
of who pays for what takes on added importance.
The majority of federal environmental mandates-including those im-
posed by the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 45 the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA," or Superfund Act),46 the
Endangered Species Act,47 the National Environmental Policy Act,48 the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")49 and parts of the CWA--do
not typically create "unfunded mandates."50 To be sure, compliance with these
40 Ashira P. Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 289,
304 (2011) (quotations omitted).
4' Adler, supra note 34, at 139 (citing Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REv. 535, 536-38 (1997) (arguing
for a "rebuttable presumption in favor of decentralization" in environmental policy).42 /d. at 170-71.
43 GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN, supra note 15, at 15 (citing NYC Office of the Comptroller,
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, Fiscal Years 2002-2009).
44 See supra Part I.A. 1.
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7700 (2012).
46 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2012).
47 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).
48 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012).
49 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2012).
0 Some obligations imposed by CERCLA and RCRA are a notable exception in this regard, as
municipalities may incur significant costs under both statutes to the extent that municipal landfills
currently or formerly received hazardous wastes for disposal.
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statutes can be costly, with some obligations running into the hundreds of mil-
lions or even billions of dollars,5 but such costs are supposed to be outweighed
by benefits at least at the general level, if not determined with specificity in
particular cases.12 At a theoretical level and in the private context, the "polluter
pays" principle can be understood as a mechanism to simply recoup externali-
ties that would otherwise unfairly subsidize firm profits. 3
This rationale breaks down in the public, municipal context, where costs
do not come from profits that would otherwise go to investors, but rather are
passed on to local ratepayers and taxpayers.5 4 Taking the analogy a step further,
the practical effect of such unfunded mandates is to shift the costs of federal
programs from the federal government to local governments and their tax ba-
ses. Since it is generally the case that federal taxes are progressive while local
water rates are regressive (i.e., are the same per unit of water regardless of
household income), such cost shifting to municipalities raises important issues
with regard to affordability.5 That is one reason a significant element of the
1972 CWA was the sixteen billion dollar initial authorization for the POTW
Construction Grant program between 1972 and 1976,56 with federal expendi-
tures on POTWs growing from half a billion dollars per year in 1970 to a peak
of six billion dollars per year in 1977.17 And that is why the shift in the late
1980s to the Clean Water State Revolving Fund ("CWSRF") program, which
provides low interest loans that nonetheless have to be repaid and add to mu-
nicipal utility debt, contributed to a financial crisis with bankruptcies or near
collapses related to wastewater mandates in Jefferson County, Alabama; Stock-
ton, California; Detroit, Michigan; and other locations.5 8 Reflecting this trend,
11 See, e.g., DePalma, supra note 26 ("According to the E.P.A., more than 70 businesses will have
to pay for the Passaic [River] cleanup [in northern New Jersey], which could cost more than $3
billion.").
52 Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 49 (1995)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571) requires that each federal agency conduct a cost-
benefit analysis and select the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative
before promulgating any proposed or final rule that may result in expenditures of more than $100
million (adjusted for inflation) in any one year by state, local, and tribal governments, or by the
private sector. Each agency must also seek input from state, local, and tribal governments. The
White House Office of Management and Budget reports on agency compliance in an annual report
to Congress. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TOBAL ENTITIES (2011), available at http://perma.cc/39-
D9FW.
13 See Jonathan R. Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict between Tradable Pollution Allowances and
the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 472-78 (2000) (discussing a range
of "strong" and "weak" interpretations of the polluter pays principle).
11 See Press Release, U.S. Conference of Mayors, Mayors Discuss Urgent Need for New Strate-
gies as Clean Water Act Turns 40, (May 31, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/NX5-KKW2.
'I See NAT'L Ass' OF CLEAN WATER AGENCIES, FINANCIAL CAPABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY IN
WET WEATHER NEGOTIATIONS (2005), available at http://perma.cc/E8L8-9DUT.5
6 WINSTON HARRINGTON & PETER NELSON, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, PUBLIC TREATMENT OF
PRIVATE WASTE: INDUSTRIAL USE OF MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT 4 (2006), available at
http://perma.cc/QA3Z-A97K.
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Mary W. Walsh, In Alabama, a County that Fell Off the Financial Cliff, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2012, at B1 ("The county ... is drowning under $4 billion in debt, the legacy of a big
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the expansion of the NPDES program to include stormwater was not accompa-
nied by a federal grants program to help municipalities defray the costs associ-
ated with required infrastructure improvements such as capital intensive CSO
storage facilities.59 This leaves local governments liable for the full cost of fed-
erally mandated infrastructure improvements, often with little or no flexibility
in deciding how, where, and when to make needed investments. Unlike in other
regulatory contexts, where environmental objectives are achieved within a co-
operative federalism framework that emphasizes partnerships at least between
federal and state authorities,6" and sometimes, local authorities, EPA's
stormwater program arguably treats municipal governments as polluters, not
partners. 6'
B. New Thinking in Urban Sustainability
Robust theories of federalism in environmental law have proliferated for
decades, with sophisticated arguments and counterarguments in favor of state
or federal preeminence articulated by some of the nation's leading scholars.62
Notably, there has not yet been a similar flowering of scholarship on federal-
municipal governance, particularly when it comes to the regulation, environ-
mental or otherwise, of urban landscapes. 63 Because in most states there are
relatively few state regulatory authorities in the field of land use law, the direct
interaction between federal regulatory agencies and local governments is
thrown into starkest relief where federal environmental law bumps up against
sewer project and corrupt[ion] .... "). Significantly, while the federal government gives grants to
states, the State Revolving Funds principally make loans to municipalities; these loans have to be
repaid and thus add to outstanding debt.
See GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN, supra note 15, at 37.
6 For example, Title I, Part A, of the CAA requires EPA to establish National Ambient Air Qual-
ity Standards ("NAAQS") that set the maximum permissible levels of pollutants for which air
quality criteria have been issued. 42 U.S.C. § 7409. States, in turn, are required to develop State
Implementation Plans ("SIPs") to determine, based on local conditions and needs, how to imple-
ment the NAAQS and related requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Section 110 of the CAA provides
the framework for SIP development and submission by States to EPA "within 3 years (or such
shorter period as the [EPA] Administrator may prescribe)" of promulgation of a NAAQS. 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
61 Written Testimony, David Berger, United States Conference of Mayors Before the Water Re-
sources Subcommittee - House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, at 17-18 (July 25,
2012) ("The U.S. Conference of Mayors urges U.S. EPA to cease treating local governments as
polluters, and instead work with local governments as partners in environmental and public health
stewardship .... ").
62 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
108, 109-13 (2005) (examining common arguments in scholarly debates about environmental
federalism); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MicH. L. REV. 570,
599-605 (1996) (discussing the origins and state of the environmental federalism debate).
63 Ostrow, supra note 24, at 1401-02 ("[T]he legal literature has yet to develop a robust theory of
federalism to tie together the disparate strands of federal land-use law."). Notably, a significant
body of scholarship has emerged around the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), which "scholars have repeatedly denounced . . . [as] a tool that religious
individuals and organizations may use to thwart municipal zoning plans and to undermine local
communities' land use needs." Brain Alden, Reconsidering RLUIPA: Do Religious Land Use Pro-
tections Really Benefit Religious Land Users?, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1779, 1779 (2010).
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local land use controls.64 These issues have come to a head in the context of
municipal stormwater regulation because of the significant expenses involved,
and because stormwater remedies can involve traditionally local regulation of
land use. This Section discusses new approaches to federalism in light of urban
sustainability initiatives.
1. Modular Environmental Regulation, Local Environmental Law
Environmental problems and natural resource management at the ecosys-
tem or watershed scale tend not to lend themselves to neat jurisdictional divi-
sions, whether among federal, state, and local agencies or the separate statutory
mandates of, say, the CWA and the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA").65
Rather, complex regulatory challenges such as those presented by municipal
stormwater management call for flexible multi-stakeholder approaches that pri-
oritize creative problem solving at the local level over command-and-control
permitting and penalties imposed from the top down.66
These ideas are not new. In 1993, Peter Lehner, then the Deputy Chief of
the Environmental Law Division of the New York City Law Department,
penned an influential article that called for greater emphasis on the municipal
enforcement of federal environmental laws, pointing out that local governments
often have greater incentives to act, better knowledge and flexibility to tackle
the most pressing problems first, and the ability to respond more quickly than
federal or state regulators.67
A few years later, the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy
launched its "Next Generation Project," engaging students, regulators, business
leaders, and a range of policy experts in a wide-ranging review of national
environmental laws, which at the time were deemed to need an injection of new
and different thinking.68 Among its findings and recommendations, the Yale
study concluded that "next-generation [environmental] strategies should be
cooperative, not confrontational; comprehensive, not fragmented; and flexibly
tailored to local contexts, rather than constrained by a 'one-size-fits-all'
approach." 69
In a 2005 article, Professors Jody Freeman and Daniel Farber dubbed this
sort of approach a "modular" conception of environmental regulation, which in
64 Ostrow, supra note 24, at 1403 (citing Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-
Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv. 959 (2007)).
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j.
6 See, e.g., John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law,
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 365, 371-72 (2002) ("Perhaps the recent advent of local environmental
law ... suggests a strategic solution to the problem of imposing federal environmental solutions
on local and state land use decision-making."). But see Salkin, supra note 32 (examining the
ongoing importance of a federal role in local land use planning).
67 Lehner, supra note 6. Since 2006, Lehner has served as the Executive Director of the Natural
Resources Defense Council, and previously served as Chief of the Environmental Protection Bu-
reau of the New York State Attorney General's Office, among other positions.
68 See THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Marian R.
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (reporting the results of the Next Generation Project).
69 Nolon, supra note 66, at 411.
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their view should allow for a wide ranging, collaborative approach to problem
solving, involving multiple levels of government as well as private actors.70
This view stands in stark contrast to what has become the conventional wisdom
on cooperative federalism and the environment, where the focus is on specific
federal or state (rarely local) agencies that have specific statutory authority to
regulate or otherwise manage specific environmental resources like air, water,
or wildlife habitat. This specificity leads, in some cases, to "regulatory frac-
ture," as "the diffusion of authority across agencies at all levels of government
can result in a vacuum of leadership for larger, system wide problems" such as
pollution or conservation at the level of a watershed, which may extend beyond
the jurisdiction of a particular agency, or indeed, a single state or even
country. 71
The insights behind the theory of modular environmental regulation and
the championing of "local" environmental law are, today, finding their greatest
real-world expression in urban sustainability programs. The unique link be-
tween stormwater regulation and land use controls is particularly well suited to
the sort of coordinated, flexible approach contemplated by these theoretical
frameworks. Indeed, programs using green infrastructure for stormwater man-
agement provide a practical model for the integration of urban sustainability
initiatives and federal environmental regulation.
2. Agreement-Based Regulation at the Municipal-Federal Interface
Closer coordination between city governments and federal regulators may
in some cases be unnecessarily stymied because many regulatory regimes em-
power state officials with delegated federal authority and task them with direct
implementation of federal programs, circumventing city officials. In certain in-
stances this sub-delegation works well for municipalities, as state regulators
can often be more attuned to local needs, especially since state-level officials
are subject to some degree of political accountability from many of the same
stakeholders and citizens, as are their municipal counterparts. The role for mu-
nicipal actors is or should be especially large in those areas where federal envi-
ronmental controls disproportionately affect local land use planning, since
municipalities historically have had near-plenary authority to regulate land
use. 72 The federal regulation of municipal stormwater management and CSO
mitigation is one clear instance of such an area.
At the municipal-federal interface, where federal environmental standards
bump up against local planning and zoning authority, coordination between
cities and federal regulators may sometimes be difficult but can nonetheless, in
certain circumstances, be catalyzed by the transformation of a "conflict into a
set of questions about a problem. '73 In our current era of fiscal constraint, for
70 Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DuKE L.J. 795, 798
(2005).
1, Id. at 877.
71 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
7' Freeman & Farber, supra note 70, at 878.
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instance, the ongoing conflict between federal stormwater management man-
dates and local preferences and priorities has the potential to be transformed
into new cooperative arrangements. Tight budgets, citizen engagement at the
neighborhood and citywide levels, and a budding awareness of and interest in
urban sustainability programs are all factors which are helping policy makers
think about old problems in terms of new and different questions. EPA's Inte-
grated Framework is only the most recent and visible manifestation of this
changing dynamic.74 In exploring cooperative arrangements between federal
and municipal authorities, the Integrated Framework emphasizes several princi-
ples: a functional approach to problems; an agreement-based framework as op-
posed to an enforcement-oriented strategy; an emphasis on adaptive
management and learning; and the involvement and participation of community
stakeholders.
a. Agreements, Not Enforcement
Complex urban problems require government and regulatory structures in
which "form follows function, such that institutional design can be consciously
tailored to policy goals."75 New York City's Green Infrastructure Plan takes a
functional approach to CSOs, situating mitigation activities within PlaNYC's
"holistic framework for meeting the City's . . . infrastructure needs over the
next 20 years" with initiatives that "typically make progress toward several
[sustainability] goals at the same time," creating an interagency partnership
(the Green Infrastructure Task Force) to implement projects, authorizing a
Green Infrastructure Fund, and launching a set of community partnerships to
develop programs for the construction and maintenance of green infrastructure
across the cityscape. 76
The success of newer forms of environmental regulation involving cooper-
ative arrangements between federal and municipal actors thus often depends in
large part on the willing participation of a wide range of regulators, regulated
entities, and other stakeholders whose agreement forms the basis for the coordi-
nation that must take place in order to achieve broad-based sustainability objec-
tives. As Freeman and Farber point out in the context of the CalFed Bay Delta
Program in Northern California:
[A]greements, both formal and informal, appear more prevalent than
rules, limits and prohibitions. Not that rules are unimportant. As
agencies turn to implementation, they rely on their traditional regula-
71 Memorandum from Nancy Stoner, EPA Acting Asst. Admin. for Water, to EPA Reg'l Admin.,
Integrated Municipal Stormwater and Wastewater Planning Approach Framework 2 (June 5,
2012), available at http://perma.cc/5QGH-DUY4.
71 Freeman & Farber, supra note 70, at 798. This functional approach to problem solving is neces-
sary because extant institutions and rules are all too often "siloed" and inflexible, incapable of
adapting to the more integrated planning paradigm necessary to achieve twenty-first century sus-
tainability objectives such as those included in PIaNYC and other comparable planning
frameworks.
76 GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN, supra note 15, at 11, 17.
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tory authority and will of course employ the conventional tools of
regulation. But these are not the focus of discussion initially. Because
modularity amounts to a movement toward agreement-based regula-
tion and management, it shifts the regulatory spotlight to a host of
instruments that do not generally attract much attention in either ad-
ministrative or environmental law."
These sorts of instruments and other more informal kinds of agreements
operate in ways that are quite different from the rigid, judicially sanctioned
consent decrees typically utilized in CWA enforcement proceedings; many such
consent decrees have compelled city governments to take certain actions and
spend specified sums according to a detailed timeline, leaving little room for
adaptation, flexibility, or collaborative learning.78
Notably, the use of federal consent decrees is by no means limited to water
quality enforcement, or even to environmental regulation more broadly. The
U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), for instance, makes extensive use of con-
sent decrees to investigate and enforce certain mandates against local police
departments found to have violated federal civil rights laws.79 As in the case of
CSO consent decrees, local law enforcement authorities have increasingly
raised concerns about what they see as exorbitant costs, unreasonably high
standards, unnecessarily adversarial rather than collaborative federal-municipal
interactions, and inadequate measures to tell whether federal intervention is
effective.80 According to The New York Times, "federal intervention has be-
come far more common and much broader in scope under the Obama adminis-
7 Freeman & Farber, supra note 70, at 881.
78 To take just one example, a 2010 federal consent decree in Kansas City, Missouri mandated that
the municipality conduct preventative maintenance on 283 miles of sewer per year regardless of
need or cost. Consent Decree at 8, United States v. Kansas City, Missouri (W.D. Mo., May 18,
2010), available at http://perma.cc/4567-AK27. It should be noted here, however, that this consent
decree also contains adaptive management and green infrastructure elements, and thus represents
something of a transitional moment in EPA's approach to CSOs. As of this writing, it remains to
be seen whether the new Integrated Framework will be fully operationalized at the regional and
municipal level in a meaningful way.
"9 Civil rights violations by municipal law enforcement agencies are subject to oversight by DOJ
pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("VCCLEA"), Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14141), the anti-discrimination
provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3789d), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d). Under Sec-
tion 14141 of VCCLEA, DOJ has the authority to file civil suits against local law enforcement
agencies that engage in a pattern or practice of misconduct. DOJ is authorized under the Safe
Streets Act and Title VI to sue law enforcement agencies that engage in discrimination if they
receive federal funds. DOJ relied on all three of these statutes in a recent, high profile consent
decree entered into with the New Orleans Police Department. See Press Release, U.S. Department
of Justice, Justice Department Announces Consent Decree with City of New Orleans to Resolve
Allegations of Unlawful Misconduct by New Orleans Police Department (July 24, 2012), availa-
ble at http://perma.cc/5KJS-ZJEQ.8 Erica Goode, Some Chiefs Chafing as Justice Department Keeps Closer Eye on Policing, N.Y.
Times, July 27, 2013, http://perma.cc/4CP4-F46C.
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tration,"' a development that in some ways mirrors the increased reliance on
consent decrees in the water quality context.
Crucially, agreement-based regulation ought not to serve as a smokescreen
for wholesale deregulation or the piecemeal loosening of pollution standards, as
some would prefer. Incorporating some much needed flexibility into environ-
mental regulation and emphasizing coordination over conflict does not mean
that polluters should be given free rein to self-police. Indeed, state and federal
permitting authorities have an ongoing and important role to play in integrating
new green infrastructure approaches to stormwater management into a variety
of regulatory instruments used to ensure compliance with the CWA, including
permits, consent decrees and Long-Term Control Plans ("LTCPs"),82 which are
mechanisms designed to facilitate and ensure municipalities' compliance with
EPA's CSO Control Policy. 3 These authorities must also track and verify the
extensive post-construction monitoring obligations that are built into those per-
mits, consent decrees and LTCPs incorporating relatively novel green infra-
structure components. 84
b. Adaptive Management and Learning
Adaptive management has been defined as an approach in which "policy
measures are understood as provisional and subject to modification in light of
scientific advances and the results of rigorous monitoring."85 Especially where
complex urban planning and design considerations interact with ever-changing
natural and biological processes, an adaptive management framework will
likely yield better outcomes, at lower cost, than a traditionally rigid regulatory
regime. Rather than "codifying existing knowledge in rules that are hard to
change," 86 adaptive management approaches to environmental regulation make
use of learning, including social and community-based learning, to achieve de-
sired results. The challenge of course is ensuring that regulatory structures are
both responsive enough to learn and adapt while retaining the integrity neces-
sary to function effectively.87
i. Community-Scale Participation
Broad, multi-stakeholder participation and accountability mechanisms,
whether formal or informal, are hallmarks of the sort of agreement-based regu-
lation being put into place at the municipal-federal interface to deal with com-
plex contemporary challenges such as CSOs. Particularly in the case of green
infrastructure systems, which involve distributed networks of green roofs, rain
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., Green City, Clean Waters, PHILADELPHIA WATER DEP'T, http://perma.cc/3463-ASRQ.
11 See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
14 See EPA, CSO POST CONSTRUCTION COMPLIANCE MONITORJNG GUIDANCE (May 2012), availa-
ble at http://perma.cc/9BE5-7XH3
85 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dyna-
mism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 202 (2002).
86 Id. at 203.
87 Freeman & Farber, supra note 70, at 888.
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gardens, and cisterns that will be built near homes and businesses and are likely
to be maintained in part by volunteers, local residents, or businesses, commu-
nity participation is vital to the success of many new regulatory initiatives.88
Moreover, community participation can help to inform the policy making pro-
cess, often leading to shifts in strategy as new ideas and local knowledge
"trickle up" to policy makers and regulators. 89
II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT, STORMWATER REGULATION, AND CITIES
A. Statutory Framework
Throughout most of U.S. history, water pollution control and associated
land use regulation largely occurred at the local level. 90 This began to change in
the early 1970s, as Congress enacted sweeping environmental statutes, includ-
ing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 91 as amended by the Clean
Water Act of 197792 and the Water Quality Act of 198793 (collectively, the
Clean Water Act or "CWA"), designed to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. '94 At the most basic
level, the CWA is composed of two broad elements.
First, it provides a comprehensive statutory framework for regulating the
discharge of pollutants into "navigable waters," which are defined broadly by
statute and regulation to include a wide swath of tributaries and wetlands that
may not fit within the normal English language meaning of the word "naviga-
ble." 95 For discharges from point sources such as pipes and sewers,9 6 the
8' By no means does green infrastructure depend wholly on volunteerism. Many features of New
York City's Green Infrastructure Plan, for instance, involve the installation of green swales and
other streetscape modifications that are undertaken wholly by municipal agencies such as DEP.
GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN, supra note 15. Nevertheless, especially as compared with tradi-
tional grey infrastructure, green infrastructure components do depend on a greater degree of pri-
vate sector and community involvement. This dependency makes strong oversight, monitoring,
and enforcement, if only as a backstop, particularly important.
8' For a thoughtful discussion of these and other related issues, see generally Alexandra Dunn &
Nancy Stoner, From Rooftops to Rivers: Green Infrastructure Yields Economic and Environmen-
tal Benefits, AM. PUB. WORKS Assr REP. ONLINE, Feb. 2008, http://perma.cc/HQQg-HMDT; Al-
exandra Dunn, Siting Green Infrastructure: Legal and Policy Solutions to Alleviate Urban Poverty
and Promote Healthy Communities, 37 ENV. AFF. 41 (2010).
9 See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental
Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002); William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water
Pollution Control in the United States-State, Local and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part 1, 22
STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 145 (2003); William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in
the United States-State, Local and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part H, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
215 (2003).
9' Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387).
9 2 Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387).
" Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387).
9 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
9' The CWA itself defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States, including terri-
torial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The Army Corps of Engineers has given the term more specific-
ity, including tributaries and wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1993); 40
C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1993). In Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
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NPDES program requires facilities to obtain permits, issued either by EPA or
state/tribal authorities, prior to discharge.97 Such permits typically include a
combination of technology-based and water quality-based pollution limits, as
well as a set of monitoring and reporting requirements tailored to the specific
facility and industry in question.9s Second, and critically, the law initially pro-
vided funding to municipalities through a construction grant program to en-
courage them to build sewage treatment plants, also known as publicly owned
treatment works ("POTWs").99
In addition to the NPDES program-which in 1987 was expanded to
cover stormwater discharges-the CWA contains specialized provisions for the
protection of wetlands,'00 estuaries,' 0' and nationally significant bodies of
water-such as the Chesapeake Bay, the Great Lakes, and Long Island
Sound;1°u the prevention of oil spills from aboveground and underground stor-
age tanks; 03 the pretreatment of indirect discharges of pollutants to POTWs; 14
the regulation of non-point source pollution; 05 and the establishment of total
maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") of specified pollutants for impaired waters
that do not meet the national goal of "fishable/swimmable" waters after the
implementation of mandated pollution controlsI0 6
Within the CWA's overall statutory framework, different programs and ini-
tiatives focus on different water quality problems, many of which affect munic-
tional limits of the CWA's jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause by determining (in five sepa-
rate opinions) whether a wetland or tributary is indeed a "water of the United States" and
therefore subject to the CWA's Section 404 permitting requirements (governing the disposal of
dredge or fill material). 547 U.S. 715 (2006); see also Memorandum on Clean Water Act Jurisdic-
tion Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v.
United States to the EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (June 5, 2007), available at http://
perma.cc/US2L-D38G.
I EPA defines a point source as "any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, including
but not limited to, any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, roll-
ing stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, landfill leachate collection system, vessel or
other floating craft from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
" The NPDES program is administered by EPA until a state, tribe, or territory successfully applies
to administer the program according to federal standards. Where the administration has been dele-
gated to the state, a permittee must obtain a State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("SPDES") permit in lieu of a federal (NPDES) permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). In this way, the
structure of the CWA is one of "cooperative federalism." See ROBIN K. CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN CONTEXT 677 (2d ed. 2008).
98 See EPA OFFICE OF WASTEWATER MGMT., WATER PERMITrING 101 2-3, available at http://
perma.cc/ZXV3-JT5V.
" Title II of the CWA (1972) provided for the original POTW construction grant program. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1281-1301. The Water Quality Act of 1987 replaced this program with the Clean Water
State Revolving Fund ("CWSRF') program. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1381-87. For a discussion of the
POTW construction grant program's funding levels over time, see Harrington & Nelson, supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
1- 33 U.S.C. § 1344.1O1 § 1330.
102 § 1267; §1268; § 1269.
103 § 1321.
104 § 1317(b).
'o § 1329.
00 §1313(d). The "fishable/swimmable" goal is identified in Section 101 of the Clean Water Act.
§1251(a)(2).
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ipalities in particular ways. The non-stormwater NPDES program, for instance,
covers both industrial and municipal facilities, but through the POTW construc-
tion grant program, 07 substantial federal assistance was initially made available
to municipalities to help meet pollutant discharge standards. The stormwater
program, however, stands out. The NPDES-related stormwater permit require-
ments distinctively "treat communities as polluters"''0 and impose huge costs
directly on municipalities by requiring often-significant capital investments.
Additionally, the stormwater program does not provide federal money to help
defray municipal government expenditures associated with mandated infra-
structure improvements. This combination-imposing high costs without pro-
viding financial aid-makes the federal regulation of stormwater under the
CWA unusual.
B. Stormwater Regulation
Urban stormwater runoff has the potential to contain "suspended metals,
sediments, algae-promoting nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorus), floatable
trash, used motor oil, raw sewage, pesticides, and other toxic contaminants"
into America's waters, particularly during the "first flush" from rain after a
long dry period during which pollutants build up. ' 9 According to one recent
estimate by EPA, such runoff contributes to pollution in approximately thirteen
percent of all impaired rivers and streams, eighteen percent of all impaired
lakes, and thirty-two percent of all impaired estuaries nationwide."0 Yet EPA
initially exempted stormwater discharges from NPDES permitting require-
ments,"' treating stormwater as a form of non-point source pollution and thus
(largely) not subject to regulation."2
This exemption was held unlawful by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in 1977," 3 but EPA took only limited steps to
regulate stormwater discharges. By the mid-1980s it was clear that stormwater
(defined under current EPA regulations to include stormwater runoff, snow
melt runoff, and surface runoff and drainage) 14 remained one of the leading
causes of water pollution.' 5 Responding to heightened public concern and
ongoing litigation on the issue, Congress passed the Water Quality Act of 1987,
amending the CWA to require NPDES permitting of stormwater discharges
"07 See Harrington & Nelson, supra note 56.
o Salkin, supra note 32, at 281.
09 Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 840-41 (9th Cir. 2003).
,oNRDC, RooFrOPS TO RIVERS H 7 (2013) (citing EPA, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PHASE I
STORMWATER REGULATIONS 17 (2000)).
. See 40 C.F.R. §125.4 (1975).
1 2 See generally Envtl. Def Ctr., 344 F.3d at 841, n.8 (citing Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v.
Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 1998)). However, some types of stormwater, including
agricultural runoff and discharges from small municipal separate storwater systems ("MS4s")
outside urbanized areas, continue to be exempt from CWA regulation.
"3 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
114 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13).
"' Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In 1985, three-quarters of the
States cited urban stormwater runoff as a major cause of waterbody impairment.").
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from industrial facilities, municipalities, and other sources necessary "to pro-
tect water quality,"16 as determined by EPA.
The 1987 CWA amendments set rigid timelines for EPA to promulgate
new stormwater rules and to issue permits to dischargers. In a series of Ninth
Circuit cases, environmental groups challenged EPA's rulemakings on a num-
ber of grounds, winning partial relief and compelling the agency to finalize and
strengthen the rules in certain key respects." 7 EPA's Stormwater Phase I and
Phase II Rules now require municipal separate stormwater systems
("MS4s")-serving large/medium and smaller municipalities, respectively-to
obtain NPDES permits and achieve a set of stormwater management objectives
using a range of best management practices. 1 ' The rules also apply to a wide
variety of industrial and construction activities."19
In an acknowledgement of the unique stormwater management challenges
confronting municipalities with CSS rather than MS4 infrastructure, in the
early 1990s EPA launched an effort with a diverse set of stakeholders represent-
ing the utility industry and environmental groups (including the Association of
Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies - subsequently renamed the National Asso-
ciation of Clean Water Agencies) to develop a consensus policy. The culmina-
tion of this effort was EPA's 1994 CSO Control Policy,2 0 which set out broad
parameters for both short- and long-term municipal regulatory and other activi-
ties to control CSOs. The 1994 CSO Control Policy defines a CSO as "the
discharge from a CSS at a point prior to the POTW Treatment Plant," and
specifies that CSOs "are point sources subject to NPDES permit requirements
including both technology-based and water quality-based requirements of the
CWA.',121
However, rather than creating a single standard for CSO control to apply
uniformly to municipalities across the nation, EPA "recognize[d] the site-spe-
cific nature of CSOs and their impacts and provide[d] the necessary flexibility
to tailor controls to local situations."' 122 The CSO Control Policy required mu-
nicipalities to begin implementing "nine minimum controls" comprised of best
management practices such as regular maintenance of CSS and public notifica-
tion of CSO occurrences and impacts, which were understood to be low-cost
116 33 U.S.C. § 134 2(p)( 3).
.. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992); Defenders of Wildlife v.
Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999); Envtl. Def. Ctr., 344 F. 3d 832.
".. EPA, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM PERMIT APPLICATION REGULA-
TIONS FOR STORMWATER DISCHARGES (PHASE I RULE), available at http://perrna.cc/9V7J-AVBN;
EPA, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM-REGULATIONS FOR REVISION OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM ADDRESSING STORM WATER DISCHARGES (PHASE II
RULE), available at http://perma.cc/7MMQ-TNCC.
119 Id.
20 59 Fed. Reg. 18688 (April 19, 1994). Congress amended the CWA in 2000 to require munici-
palities to comply with EPA's CSO Control Policy. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(q). Notably, an appropri-
ations bill directly translated EPA's CSO Control Policy into statute with very little discussion and
limited input from stakeholders, including the municipal governments that would be most directly
affected by the policy's new requirements. The policy would have benefited from a more thorough
vetting through the rulemaking process.
121 59 Fed. Reg. 18688, 18689 (1994).
122 Id. at 18688.
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tasks that could begin immediately. 113 Separately, the CSO Control Policy re-
quired utilities to assess more costly capital projects in LTCPs, which were to
phase any recommended construction over many years.'24
By its terms, the CSO Control Policy grants municipalities latitude to work
with NPDES permitting authorities and state regulators in both implementing
the nine minimum controls and developing LTCPs, including by granting them
the option of choosing between either a "presumption" or "demonstration"
approach to compliance in any given LTCP.125 EPA has expanded on this prin-
ciple of flexibility by promulgating the Integrated Framework, which expressly
acknowledges that the complex challenges facing municipalities today are ill-
suited to an approach focused on "each CWA requirement individually without
full consideration of all CWA obligations," leading to "the unintended conse-
quence of constraining a municipality from addressing its most serious water
quality issues first."' 26 Recently, EPA took another step forward when it re-
leased a comprehensive planning resource to provide municipalities with tools
to help quantify and better integrate green infrastructure elements into their
CSO control plans.'27
In theory, the Integrated Framework encourages a municipality's inte-
grated plan to include NPDES requirements for separate sanitary sewer sys-
tems, CSS, MS4s, and POTWs, where appropriate, 2 and allows all or part of a
plan to be incorporated into a single NPDES permit. 29 The Integrated Frame-
work defines six overarching elements that should be addressed in every plan:
(i) a description of issues to be addressed; (ii) a description of existing waste-
water and stormwater systems; (iii) a stakeholder engagement and communica-
tion process; (iv) a process for identifying, evaluating, and selecting
alternatives; (v) a monitoring and measurement plan; and (vi) a process for
making modifications and improvements over time. It also provides for the
incorporation of integrated plans into permits and enforcement actions by EPA
and States. 130 EPA's Integrated Framework represents an important step in the
direction of truly integrated planning and adaptive management to achieve
long-term urban sustainability goals. In practice, however, EPA's approach to
regulation under the CWA often involves forgoing or bypassing the permit pro-
cess altogether, and regulating by inflexible consent orders. This is a severe
limitation on the potential of the new Integrated Framework to catalyze mean-
ingful changes in municipal stormwater and CSO management, including the
1
23 Id. at 18691.
124 Id. at 18694.
1
2
1 id. at 18692-93.
126 See Integrated Municipal Stornwater and Wastewater Plans, EPA.Gov (July 17, 2013), http:H
perma.cc/U9QZ-R7SH.
1
27 EPA, GREENING CSO PLANS: PLANNING AND MODELING GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR COM-
BINED SEWER OVERFLOW (CSO) CONTROL (March 2014), available at http://perma.cc/N8JM-
6S6Z.
"z Memorandum from Nancy Stoner & Cynthia Giles to EPA Reg'l Admin. (June 5, 2012), availa-
ble at http://perma.cc/EFF2-KQWN.
129 Id. at 6.
30 Id. at 4-7. The Integrated Framework also contemplates the use of memoranda of understand-
ing ("MOUs") for this purpose, but the approach remains untested as of this writing.
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adoption of green infrastructure.' Moreover, because the Integrated Frame-
work merely provides guidance and does not modify or replace any existing
regulatory or permitting standards, some city officials may question whether
EPA will simply reshuffle mandates for the installation of costly new infra-
structure without adopting a holistic, flexible approach of alternative, cost-ef-
fective solutions. 132
C. "Grey" Versus "Green" Infrastructure
1. What is Grey Infrastructure?
a. Basics
Until very recently, urban stormwater and sewer infrastructure has meant
pipes and treatment facilities. For millennia, sanitation technology consisted of
the collection, transportation, treatment, and disposal of wastewater to limit
human contact with unsanitary conditions and prevent the spread of disease.
Pipes, storage facilities, and POTWs are single-purpose stormwater infrastruc-
ture known by the shorthand of "grey infrastructure" to acknowledge the vast
amounts of concrete and other materials with high embedded energy necessary
in their construction. A wide range of grey infrastructure improvements are
available to mitigate CSOs. Grey modifications to a CSS may include such
items as new sewer systems designed to divert rainfall directly into waterways
through permitted outlets; CSO storage facilities (tanks, tunnels, and retention
basins); expanded wet weather capacity at POTWs; floatables control; and aer-
ation and dredging.'
b. Costs and Benefits
The water quality benefits of traditional grey infrastructure can be enor-
mous in areas and jurisdictions where wastewater would otherwise go un-
treated. Indeed, initial investments in such systems had high incremental gains,
as measured by avoided health care and mortality costs, improved recreation
and fisheries, or other benefits. 3 4 Yet much of the low-hanging fruit of health
and welfare benefits has already been harvested and, in many localities, addi-
tional grey infrastructure improvements have diminishing marginal benefits. In
131 See, e.g., Consent Decree, United States v. City of Youngstown, Ohio (N.D. Ohio, March 5,
2002), available at http://perma.cc/5JAJ-6K6B. A complete list of CWA consent decrees and set-
tlements dating back to 1999 is available on the EPA website at http://perma.cc/44W3-LDCW.
132 See Jeff Kray, Cities Split on Whether EPA's New "Flexible" Stormwater Management Policy
Will Save Money, MARTEN L. NEWSLETrER, http://perma.cc/5MZC-L9S5.
133 GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN, supra note 15, at 37.
"I See Richard Carson & Robert Mitchell, The Value of Clean Water: The Public's Willingness to
Pay for Boatable, Fishable, and Swimmable Quality Water, 29 WATER RESOURCES REs. 2445,
2453 (1993) (finding that "the potential annual benefits of swimmable quality water in the nation's
freshwater lakes, rivers, and streams are large and in excess of [the 1988] costs of the water
quality improvement program," but that "total costs are projected to escalate well beyond total
potential benefits owing to the higher marginal costs" of water quality improvements).
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other words, additional separated sewers or CSO storage facilities are often far
less cost-effective than the first generation of grey infrastructure.
2. What is Green Infrastructure?
a. Basics
"Green infrastructure" is a network of approaches and technologies that,
taken together, mimic, maintain, or restore natural hydrological features to al-
low for the infiltration, evapotranspiration, capture, and reuse of stormwater
that would otherwise be dealt with via traditional forms of grey infrastruc-
ture.135 Green infrastructure "uses vegetation and soil to manage rainwater
where it falls." '136 Green infrastructure approaches and technologies make use
of "soils and vegetation rather than traditional hardscape collection, convey-
ance, and storage structures,"' 37 and can include items such as "green roofs,
trees and tree boxes, rain gardens, vegetated swales, pocket wetlands, infiltra-
tion planters, vegetated median strips[,] ...permeable pavement, and rain
barrels and cisterns."' 38 When implemented at sufficient density, green infra-
structure can prevent or delay the entry of stormwater runoff into the sewers,
thereby reducing CSOs and creating a range of other benefits.
b. Water Quality Benefits
Green infrastructure reduces peak flows of stormwater runoff during and
after wet weather events by filtering water through vegetation, soils, and other
natural or artificial media. By recharging groundwater or slowing the release of
runoff to surface waters, this filtration effect has been shown to significantly
reduce both the numbers and volumes of CSOs and their associated water pol-
lution effects. 39 Because green infrastructure has the potential to achieve some
of the same water quality results as more traditional grey infrastructure ap-
proaches, the implementation of certain green infrastructure approaches and
technologies may enable city governments to downsize or eliminate grey infra-
structure components that would otherwise be mandated under their LTCPs and
consent orders. 140
c. Other Co-Benefits
In 2007 EPA's Assistant Administrator for Water enumerated many of the
most widely acknowledged co-benefits of green infrastructure. These include:
"I See Michael Sullivan et al., Green Infrastructure and NPDES Permits: One Step at a Time, 101
WATER ENV'r FEDERATION PRoc. 7801 (2010).
136 Green Infrastructure, EPA.GOV, http://perma.cc/B5SH-YHAU.
131 Memorandum from Benjamin Grumbles, EPA Asst. Admin. for Water, to EPA Reg'l Admins.,
Using Green Infrastructure to Protect Water Quality in Stormwater, CSO, Nonpoint Source and
other Water Programs 1 (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://perma.cc/3CMX-2AHX.
13
8 Id.
"I EPA, COMBINED SEWER OvERYLows 2-3, available at http://perma.cc/55VY-RBAA.
140 See id. at 2.
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* Enhanced water supplies via groundwater recharge;
* Cleaner air via the filtration of airborne pollutants by trees and
vegetation;
* Reduced urban temperatures via increasing shade and reducing the
amount of heat absorbing materials;
* Increased energy efficiency by shading and insulating buildings, reduc-
ing the energy needed for heating and cooling; and
* Community benefits such as improved urban aesthetics and the availa-
bility of recreation and wildlife areas, which can improve quality of life
and raise property values. 141
Notably, two important co-benefits of green infrastructure not included in
the 2007 EPA memo are climate change mitigation and adaptation, where the
federal government has struggled to gain traction. In contrast, adapting to and
mitigating climate change are specifically adopted as goals in New York City's
PlaNYC as well as its Green Infrastructure Plan. 42
d. Costs
The costs of green infrastructure installation and maintenance vary widely,
depending in large part on the features utilized, the labor and materials costs,
and whether projects are implemented on public streets and rights-of-way or at
buildings and other facilities.143 Although the co-benefits of green infrastructure
are harder to quantify than the immediate costs associated with the construction
and installation of grey or green infrastructure features, they have been esti-
mated with increasing rigor and precision by municipal governments. 44
In addition to its co-benefits, green infrastructure "may save capital costs"
as compared to construction, operation, and maintenance expenses associated
with grey infrastructure, including but not limited to "digging big tunnels and
stormwater ponds, . . . energy costs for pumping water; and costs of wet
weather treatment and of repairing stormwater and sewage pollution impacts,
such as streambank restoration."'' 45 As with grey infrastructure, however, green
infrastructure's costs are likely to be both program- and site-specific, and to
fluctuate to greater and lesser degrees depending on local conditions.
D. Comparing Federal and Local Approaches
1. Federal "Silos," Local Flexibility
The U.S. Conference of Mayors has characterized EPA's approach to
stormwater in terms of a "rule-by-silo/command-and-control" regulatory strat-
141 Memorandum from Benjamin Grumbles, supra note 137, at 2.
142 See GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN, supra note 15, at 26.
141 See id. at 22-23 (discussing green infrastructure cost estimates and modeling assumptions).
1" See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
145 Memorandum from Benjamin Grumbles, supra note 138.
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egy.' 46 Historically, this approach has meant that EPA tended to impose its en-
vironmental compliance mandates in a rigid, time-bound manner and on a
narrow, statute-by-statute basis, for instance with little regard to the often sig-
nificant spillover effects between overlapping CWA and SDWA compliance
activities. 147 There is a growing disconnect between the federal government's
enforcement-oriented approach to stormwater management and the more inte-
grated approach being championed by a number of American cities which fo-
cuses on long term investments in both green and grey infrastructure.
With scarce public resources available for infrastructure investment at all
levels of government, federal regulators can and should prioritize partnerships
with municipalities that have already put in place comprehensive plans to pri-
oritize investments and address the most critical needs identified at a local
level. Indeed, EPA's Integrated Framework takes some meaningful steps to
operationalize and facilitate such municipal-federal cooperation. 48 Unfortu-
nately, however, the message seems not to have gotten through to many of
those on the front lines of federal enforcement efforts.
There is a clear gap, for instance, between the approach taken in many of
EPA's recent wet-weather consent decrees and the agency's widely touted re-
form efforts, including the Integrated Framework. "Siloed" laws, regulations,
and programs that eschew comprehensive planning perpetuate this gap. For ex-
ample, EPA's Office of Compliance and Enforcement has focused on reducing
CSOs and other sources of sewage remaining after utilities have complied with
the secondary treatment standard without reference to public health impacts or
costs, let alone whether such reductions are necessary to meet existing water
quality standards.
Bypassing the normal CWA permitting process (which is largely imple-
mented by the States and may be better able to integrate adaptive management
approaches to green infrastructure), EPA and the Department of Justice have
pushed municipalities into a series of consent decrees with rigid compliance
schedules that micro-manage local budgeting and usurp local authority to regu-
late land use. 149 While consent decrees are, by their nature, legal agreements
entered into with the consent of both parties, they remain a formal and rela-
tively rigid judicial remedy that precludes some of the flexibility that munici-
palities need to effectively manage and maintain green infrastructure over the
medium- to long-term. 50
In contrast to this still dominant approach to municipal stormwater regula-
tion, many elements of a recent agreement between New York City and New
York State follow flexible, adaptive management principles and incorporate
146 Berger, supra note 61, at 2.
141 See id. at 17.
'48 See Integrated Municipal Stormwater and Wastewater Plans, supra note 126.
149 See, e.g., Consent Decree, supra note 78.
1SO But see EPA, supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's recent "Greening CSO
Plans" guidance document as an indication of the agency's increasing commitment to helping
municipalities-including those against which enforcement actions are brought-meet CWA and
CSO Control Policy requirements with green infrastructure).
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green infrastructure goals as cost-effective methods to reduce wet weather pol-
lution while providing many other important benefits to the City.'51 These prin-
ciples and goals are also emphasized in the Integrated Framework, which
acknowledges the fact that municipal governments are by their very nature
more flexible and responsive than federal regulators can be to local needs and
preferences and, in some cases, more attuned to environmental conditions on
the ground.12
2. Goal Setting and Trade-Offs
Under the traditional federal approach to stormwater regulation, goals are
rigid and trade-offs between "siloed" programs and initiatives are difficult to
consider in any meaningful way. Constrained by the statutory text passed by
Congress, in some cases more than four decades ago, EPA has only limited
flexibility to balance competing objectives or set priorities within or among
programs. The CWA's overarching goal of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters"'153 has been
operationalized over the years through a wide variety of regulatory initiatives
including, as of 1987, the incorporation of stormwater discharges in the
NPDES program and, after 1994, the application of EPA's CSO Control Policy
to CSO discharges.
Recently, EPA has moved away from its traditional approach, expressly
encouraging a more integrated approach to goal-setting in its 2012 Integrated
Framework. While stopping short of allowing municipalities complete discre-
tion in picking and choosing among goals that extend beyond the statutory
mandate of the CWA itself, EPA did indicate that its new framework should
"allow a municipality to balance CWA requirements in a manner that addresses
the most pressing public health and environmental protection issues first."' 154
This represents a real shift in both tone and substance for EPA. While it is too
soon to tell, as of this writing, whether the Integrated Framework will make a
meaningful difference in EPA's regional and enforcement offices, the mere pro-
mulgation of such a directive indicates a new openness to more flexible goal-
setting in the context of wastewater and stormwater management.
Perhaps by virtue of the fact that city governments are less constrained by
narrow statutory mandates than is EPA, municipal sustainability initiatives such
as PlaNYC and New York City's Green Infrastructure Plan are able to expressly
contemplate complex trade-offs among disparate goals and to establish priori-
ties on the basis of local preferences and needs.
151 See infra Part III.
512 See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. It remains to be seen, of course, whether
EPA's new Integrated Framework will lead to real and meaningful changes in federal enforcement
of the CWA vis-A-vis municipal stormwater management and CSO mitigation.
153 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
'I See Memorandum from Nancy Stoner, supra note 74.
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3. Cost-Effectiveness
Not only can municipal sustainability plans set goals that are more respon-
sive to local concerns than federally mandated compliance actions, but they
may also be able to achieve equivalent or even identical results in a more cost-
effective manner than plans developed pursuant to federal enforcement. Of
course, EPA's CSO Control Policy contemplates thoughtful cost-benefit analy-
sis of grey infrastructure improvements such as new CSO detention facilities,
but all too often this analysis is not undertaken in practice.
At the front line of the federal/municipal interface, EPA compliance and
enforcement staff often pushes for the greatest reduction in CSO frequency and
volume without regard for costs or relative benefits compared to mitigation of
other point and non-point sources of water pollution. Even if municipalities
achieve state water quality standards, there is often added pressure to achieve
"swimmable" water quality in every water body, including industrial and urban
waters where such recreation is unlikely to occur. Unfortunately, this approach
has often resulted in consent decrees that ignore the high costs imposed on
cities and do not assess or quantify the value of marginal benefits expected to
accrue to city residents and ratepayers. Additionally, EPA or States require
LTCPs to enumerate specific compliance benchmarks that may only be modi-
fied by subsequent written agreement and judicial approval.'55 These
benchmarks are tied to the achievement of specific water quality objectives,
and are typically established with little or no regard for cost.
A handful of LTCPs promulgated by municipalities pursuant to more re-
cent federal consent decrees do incorporate flexible compliance schedules and
green infrastructure features that help mitigate costs. 156 Notwithstanding these
new developments and the encouraging language on cost containment in EPA's
Integrated Framework, the federal approach to stormwater is relatively agnostic
on cost.57 By comparison, integrated urban sustainability plans adopted at the
municipal level go much further to expressly tackle the cost issue.'58 For exam-
ple, New York City's 2010 Green Infrastructure Plan includes a careful ac-
counting of the costs and benefits of several different future investment
scenarios, including the construction of new CSO containment tanks and tun-
nels and a more limited roster of cost-effective grey infrastructure
investments. 19
... See, e.g., N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, Order on Consent (March 8, 2012), available at
http://perma.cc/JHX6-WKHN.
156 One of the most notable examples is Philadelphia's "Green City, Clean Waters" program. See
Green City, Clean Waters, supra note 82.
157 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(q).
1
5 8 See, e.g., GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN, supra note 15.
15 9 Id. at 19-33.
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4. Innovation
Constrained by rigid statutory mandates, top-down management struc-
tures, and decades of accumulated rules, regulations, interpretations, and prac-
tices, the federal enforcement of environmental laws may be less amenable to
innovation than analogous programs at the state or municipal levels. For good
reasons, federal regulators must implement programs that have been carefully
designed to comply with the authority granted to them by Congress in enumer-
ated statutes. Moreover, some scholars have argued that "contemporary envi-
ronmental regulation and natural resource management have been shaped by a
legal regime that too often promotes the careful hoarding of information [by
"siloed" federal and state regulators] and fails to build in mechanisms for envi-
ronmental agencies to learn from their actions," further stymieing innovativethinking. 160
These limitations are much less severe at the municipal level, where offi-
cials can experiment with initiatives-sometimes on a trial or pilot-program
basis-that respond to community preferences and solve local, site-specific
problems but would be impractical if introduced first by federal regulators on a
nationwide or even regional basis. PlaNYC is a good example of how cities can
pioneer innovative solutions to complex environmental, economic, and urban
planning problems such as CSOs.' 6' By creating a policy framework and insti-
tutional architecture to support a comprehensive long-term sustainability plan,
including broad goals, frequent reporting, and accountability to voters, New
York City was able to create a "sweeping plan [across a range of different
agencies and programs] that [will guide] the city's growth over the next 25
years." 62 This plan situates its CSO mitigation plans within the context of a
broader set of urban sustainability objectives and uses innovative green infra-
structure management tools to achieve results. Not coincidentally, many of the
green infrastructure innovations pioneered by cities are now making their way
into federal programs and initiatives such as the Integrated Framework.
III. CASE STUDY: NEW YORK'S MARCH 2012 CSO CONSENT ORDER
On March 13, 2012, the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation ("DEC") and the New York City Department of Environmental
Protection ("DEP") reached an historic agreement to reduce CSOs through a
cost-effective combination of grey and green infrastructure. After negotiating
for more than a year, the two parties were able to reach agreement on a revised
consent order that will reduce CSOs by approximately twelve billion gallons
annually by 2030, approximately two billion gallons more than a prior plan that
160 Freeman & Farber, supra note 70, at 883.
161 PLANYC, supra note 3.
162 ICLEI, supra note 10, at 46.
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relied completely on traditional grey infrastructure.163 The NYC Green Infra-
structure Plan is projected to cost ratepayers approximately $2.4 billion less
than the grey infrastructure plan it replaced.
The agreement includes a commitment to build $2.9 billion in cost-effec-
five grey infrastructure as well as $2.4 billion in green infrastructure over
twenty years. DEC also agreed to defer or postpone $3.4 billion in grey infra-
structure spending for additional storage tunnels and holding tanks. 64 The re-
vised order has been celebrated by all parties because it benefits both DEC and
New York City: water quality in New York City's harbor will be higher than it
would have been under the traditional "grey" plan at a lower cost to New
Yorkers.
The consent order is structured in a way that allows the City to use an
adaptive management approach to achieve compliance. Unlike many other con-
sent orders that require specific investments on strict timelines, this agreement
sets broad performance goals and allows city officials to determine how to meet
them. Regarding green infrastructure, by 2015 the City has agreed to control
the stormwater generated by one inch of precipitation on 1.5 percent of the
impervious surfaces in combined sewer areas. 165 The milestones established in
the order require the City to increase the amount of stormwater managed at
specified intervals: four percent by 2020; seven percent by 2025; and ten per-
cent by 2030.166 To achieve these goals, the City is pursuing a multi-pronged
strategy building green infrastructure on public property, establishing new
stormwater control requirements for new private and public construction, and
funding the retrofitting of existing buildings with green infrastructure.
For the first milestone, if the City fails to meet the 1.5 percent goal in
2015, the State will consider whether there was a good faith effort to launch the
program, including consideration of whether the City has effectively committed
$187 million in public funds to build green infrastructure in specified drainage
areas. 167 For later milestones, the City will work with DEC to submit contin-
gency plans, on a rolling basis, which are to include specific green infrastruc-
ture projects "sufficient to make up the shortfall in CSO volume reduction from
[each] previous 5-year implementation period," along with forward-looking
163 N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 155, at 11. The Green Infrastructure Plan, signif-
icant elements of which are incorporated by reference directly into the consent order, states that
"over 20 years . . . [it] will reduce CSO volumes from approximately 30 billion gallons a year
["bgy"] to approximately 17.9 bgy. This is nearly 2 billion gallons lower CSO volume per year
than would be achieved by the Grey Strategy." GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN, supra note 15, at
8.
64 Separately from the March 2012 consent order, DEP estimated that the "accumulated sus-
tainability benefits" of its Green Infrastructure Plan over twenty years, including the co-benefits
enumerated above, would range from $139 million to $418 million (in 2010 dollars), depending in
large part on the amount of vegetation used in the installed infrastructure features. GREEN INFRA-
STRUCTURE PLAN, supra note 15, at 26-29.
165 N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 155, at 9.
'661d. at 11.
1671 d. at 10.
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implementation schedules.168 These milestones are also accompanied by a series
of program evaluation requirements to ensure that the City stays on track over
the coming decades. This flexible compliance standard is beneficial for both
parties because it allows the City to try new approaches as quickly as possible,
accounts for challenges that DEP may encounter installing green infrastructure
in the City's ultra-urban environment, and gives DEC robust enforcement pow-
ers-but not the draconian penalty schedules that have been a hallmark of typi-
cal state and federal consent decrees. 69
The green infrastructure consent order crafted by New York City and New
York State is a critical and groundbreaking test case of adaptive management.
The flexibility inherent in the adaptive management approach is a necessary
component of the successful implementation of green infrastructure systems.
Since many of these methods have never been tested, iterative monitoring and
redesign will be required and must be encouraged. The try-and-try-again ap-
proach is particularly important in New York City, with its wide variety of
development, land use, and geology, which will require many and varied types
of green infrastructure systems for all parts of the combined sewer system. For
example, some areas in the Bronx have high bedrock, making them less amena-
ble to retention systems such as bioswales and better suited for green roofs and
detention systems. To assess the effectiveness of green infrastructure in some of
these areas, the City has agreed to test different green infrastructure systems on
a large scale through two demonstration projects in the Bronx River and New-
town Creek watersheds. 170 The City has installed monitoring equipment in these
demonstration areas to determine flow before rolling out green infrastructure
across an entire drainage area. '71 Results from these pilot areas will drive drain-
age area-wide investment decisions and provide a wealth of original data for
future use throughout the City and in similarly dense urban areas across the
country.
These data will eventually contribute to LTCPs that define what New York
City will construct to achieve full water quality compliance in ten combined
sewer drainage areas and for a citywide LTCP. These LTCPs will be developed
with public input between 2013 and 2017, and the City is committed to imple-
menting the terms of this agreement in the most transparent way possible. 72 In
early June 2012, the City held the first of many LTCP public participation
meetings, and continues to solicit community input and involvement while
168 1d. at 12.
169 For example, an April 2013 consent decree between EPA, the City of Seattle, and King County,
Washington imposed $750,000 in penalties to be paid to the state and federal governments. Seat-
tle, Washington and King County, Washington Settlement, EPA.GOV (April 16, 2013), http://
perma.cc/FH63-FLDG.
170 N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 155, at 5.
'7' See id. at Appendix A.
172 DEP has created a website to provide public access to information relating to the development
of its LTCPs and enable public participation in the process. See Reducing Combined Sewer Over-
flows in NYC - DEP's Long Term Control Plan, DEP, http://perma.ccfU9Tr-B972.
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sharing information about progress on project construction.'73 In LTCP model-
ing workshops held in 2012 and 2013, city and state officials presented models
and proposed baseline assumptions for evaluating the benefits of CSO control
alternatives. 74 The LTCPs will bolster the adaptive management approach laid
out in other planning frameworks such as PlaNYC and the City's Green Infra-
structure Plan by obligating the City to dedicate specific resources to CSO in-
frastructure, but allowing the community and City to collaborate and develop
the most appropriate, effective, and cost-efficient uses for those resources.
The City also agreed to maintain and expand the existing Green Infrastruc-
ture Grant Program for three years.' 75 The grant program is a distinctive compo-
nent of the agreement because it provides a way for the City to fund the
construction of green infrastructure systems on existing private residential and
commercial properties, which covers a significant portion of the urban land-
scape and would otherwise not be reached by regulations that govern new con-
struction or programs for funding green infrastructure in the public right-of-
way and on other public property. In addition to the sustainable benefits of
green infrastructure discussed above, projects in the grant program provide
many additional benefits to the city including educational opportunities, re-
search and monitoring information, and innovative designs. The grant program
also helps the City to get a better return on its investments. To date, the grant
program has awarded over eleven million dollars to twenty-nine recipients such
as the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Bronx Zoo, and the New
School, and has leveraged over five million dollars in private funds.176
Moving forward, the new agreement sets a collaborative tenor in the rela-
tionship between New York City and State. Both DEP and DEC agree that it is
in their mutual interest to structure agreements that hold regulated entities to
high performance standards and maintain their ability to make decisions that
best suit local conditions, operations, and budget constraints.'77
Moreover, the agreement may provide significant data and a set of "best
practices" that can be replicated by other municipalities, at other scales, around
the country and around the world. DEP and DEC officials are keenly aware of
New York City's de facto leadership position as a policy laboratory for urban
regulatory innovation. Indeed, one of former Mayor Bloomberg's first acts after
leaving office was the establishment of a new consulting venture, staffed in part
by former City officials, to help municipal governments adopt a variety of in-
novative policies first pioneered in New York.'78 While certain green infrastruc-
ture features developed in the context of dense urban development in Brooklyn
173 Id.
174 See LTCP Citywide Meetings, DEP, http://perma.cc/6FJF-3BCD
175 N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, supra note 155, at 8.
176 See Grant Program for Private Property Owners, DEP, http://perma.cc/N3ZP-BKXF.
' "See Press Release, N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, NYSDEC & NYCDEP Announce
Groundbreaking Agreement to Reduce Combined Sewer Overflows Using Green Infrastructure in
New York City (March 13, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/938B-B8AR.
178 See Ed Hammond, Bloomberg Consultancy to Keep Spreading the Views, FT.coM, Dec. 15,
2013 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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may not be appropriate for suburban Boise or Burbank, others may be suitable
for adoption in a range of municipalities. New York City's Green Infrastructure
Program, which includes policies and initiatives that extend beyond those man-
dated by the 2012 DEP-DEC agreement, provides a wealth of information that
can be used by other cities to craft their own approaches to stormwater manage-
ment and CSO control. 179
CONCLUSION
Unlike the early days of the CWA, when nearly all communities nation-
wide faced similar challenges in meeting basic secondary treatment standards
for sewage, today a variety of problems such as stormwater pollution, CSOs,
nutrients, and emerging pollutants threaten efforts to maintain and further im-
prove the relatively high standard of water quality that many cities have
achieved. The ongoing and projected impacts of climate change will further
exacerbate these threats in the coming decades. Over the same period, the re-
placement of treatment plant equipment dating from the 1970s and 1980s,
along with sewers and conveyance systems many decades older, is projected to
cost billions. Local communities can legitimately choose to prioritize their in-
vestments to address any one or combination of these threats. And since the
federal government has essentially ended federal investment in water infra-
structure, financing for this infrastructure is entirely the responsibility of local
taxpayers and governments. This reality is increasingly at odds with the CWA
enforcement approach of the federal government, which typically seeks to im-
pose uniform, one-size-fits-all standards on disparate communities. Not only do
such efforts over-simplify the complex, location-specific threats to water qual-
ity, but also they severely constrain or wholly override the choices of those who
foot the bill, leading at best to inefficient resource allocation and at worst to
resentment and outright resistance.
This Article has suggested how the federal government may work more
effectively and collaboratively with local governments to improve water quality
across the country, particularly in urban areas. One promising trend is the use
of green infrastructure to reduce CSOs and other forms of stormwater pollution.
Where appropriate, such water quality investments create other benefits to com-
munities, fit well with broader sustainability initiatives, and enjoy widespread
support. The example of New York City shows that green infrastructure pro-
grams can be incorporated into consent orders with reportable milestones and
an adaptive management structure.
In a related development, EPA has tentatively acknowledged that its Inte-
grated Framework could, in theory, allow municipalities to prioritize CWA in-
vestments. To successfully account for variation in local needs and legitimate
choices about how to allocate scarce resources, the Integrated Framework
should be expanded into a set of comprehensive, municipally-led plans to pri-
179 See NYC Green Infrastructure Program, DEP, http://perma.cc/93KM-4M6A.
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oritize infrastructure investments that improve public health and the environ-
ment while generating other valuable co-benefits across a range of quality of
life indicia. By better aligning accountability for investment decisions with reg-
ulatory planning at the municipal level, an expanded Integrated Framework
would lead to more efficient allocation of resources, more "ownership" and
engagement of the local ratepayers who pay for CWA programs, investments
that are better tailored to local conditions, innovative ideas that seek to maxi-
mize positive externalities rather than simply comply with pollution minimiza-
tion, and less resentment towards one-size-fits-all regulations that are the
product of a myopic, national perspective. As with the groundbreaking green
infrastructure order developed by New York City and State, a strong federal or
state role would remain in making sure that such plans have a solid scientific,
data-based foundation, and that milestones (and the penalties imposed for fail-
ing to meet them) are structured in a way that encourages innovation and fo-
cuses on results.
